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ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY1 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledge⎯an anti-luck 
intuition and an ability intuition⎯and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is 
claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of 
knowledge⎯anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯which can avoid the problems that afflict other 
theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking 
about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue 
epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the 
kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology. 
 
 
1. TWO MASTER INTUITIONS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE 
 
Until relatively recently, a key task assigned to the epistemologist was to offer an adequate 
definition of knowledge, one that was informative, non-circular, and which could suitably 
accommodate our salient epistemological intuitions. Call this the analytical project. This project has 
fallen into disfavour recently, with many arguing that it is a hopeless task.2 Given the lack of 
success that epistemologists have had on this score it is not surprising that a disconsolate mood 
should have set in amongst those working on this project. Nevertheless, such pessimism is 
premature. Indeed, I will be arguing that there is an adequate theory of knowledge available which 
fulfils the remit of the analytical project.  
 Central to my proposal is the idea that we need to reconsider two overarching intuitions 
which govern our thinking about knowledge; specifically, our thinking regarding what turns true 
belief into knowledge. The first will be very familiar indeed. This is the intuition that when one 
knows one’s cognitive success (i.e., one’s believing truly) is not a matter of luck. Call this the anti-
luck intuition. Consult any introductory text in the theory of knowledge and you will find a 
statement of this intuition. If, for example, a commentator is asked to explain why mere true belief 
cannot suffice for knowledge, the standard response is to point out that in cases of mere true 
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belief, unlike knowledge, one’s cognitive success can simply be a matter of luck.3 The role of this 
intuition in contemporary theory of knowledge is particularly apparent in the post-Gettier 
literature, where it is often stated that precisely the point of the Gettier cases is that they 
demonstrate that justified true belief is compatible with one’s cognitive success being merely due 
to luck. The failure of the tripartite account to accommodate the anti-luck intuition is thus meant 
to be a decisive strike against it.4 
 The second intuition is not so universally expressed, but it is certainly discernible in much of 
our thinking about knowledge. This is the intuition that knowledge requires cognitive ability, in the 
sense that when one knows one’s cognitive success should be the product of one’s cognitive 
ability. Call this the ability intuition. Again, one finds a commitment to this intuition being 
presupposed in introductory discussions of why mere true belief does not amount to knowledge. 
The worry about mere true belief, we are standardly told, is that it needn’t be formed in the “right 
way”, where this means via a process that is appropriate to the acquisition of knowledge. But what 
is a belief-forming process which is appropriate to the acquisition of knowledge if it is not a 
cognitive ability?5 Thus, a commitment to this intuition is tacitly supposed.6 
 Interestingly, these intuitions are often run together, or at least a clear statement of one of 
them (typically the anti-luck intuition) tends to go hand-in-hand with remarks that entail a 
commitment to the other intuition. On reflection, there is good reason for this since there do 
seem to be very close connections between these two intuitions. What does it take to ensure that 
one’s cognitive success is not due to luck? Well, intuitively anyway, that it is the product of one’s 
cognitive ability. Conversely, insofar as one’s cognitive success is the product of one’s cognitive 
ability, then⎯again, intuitively⎯one would expect it to thereby be immune to knowledge-
undermining luck. One might thus regard these two intuitions as two ‘faces’ of a single intuition. If 
that’s right, then any epistemic condition on knowledge which is formulated in order to satisfy the 
anti-luck intuition (call this an anti-luck condition) will, if successful, thereby satisfy the ability 
intuition, and any epistemic condition which is formulated in order to satisfy the ability intuition 
(call this an ability condition) will, if successful, thereby satisfy the anti-luck intuition.  
 I will be arguing that this conception of how these two master intuitions about knowledge 
are related to each other is fundamentally flawed. In particular, I will be claiming that these two 
intuitions in fact impose independent epistemic demands on our theory of knowledge, and that it 
is only once one recognises this fact that one can offer a successful resolution of the analytical 
project. My strategy for demonstrating this will be to explore two popular contemporary 
approaches to the analytical project which each take one of these intuitions about knowledge as 
central to their approach. The first, what I call an anti-luck epistemology, takes the anti-luck intuition 
as core and then aims to formulate an anti-luck condition which can accommodate this intuition 
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and thereby offer us an adequate theory of knowledge, one that can also accommodate the ability 
intuition. The second, what I call a virtue epistemology, takes the ability intuition as core and then 
aims to formulate an ability condition which can accommodate this intuition and thereby offer us 
an adequate theory of knowledge, one that can also accommodate the anti-luck intuition.  
 I will argue that both proposals fail, and fail precisely because they are unable to fully 
accommodate the particular master intuition which they do not treat as core. What the failure of 
these two approaches demonstrates, I will claim, is that we need to conceive of the two master 
intuitions as imposing distinct epistemic demands, and hence as requiring independent epistemic 
conditions. The view that results, what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology, can deal with the full gamut 
of ‘test’ cases in the theory of knowledge. Moreover, I will argue that one can also offer a plausible 
account of why the epistemic component of knowledge might have this bipartite structure. Far 
from being a lost cause, the analytical project is shown to be back in business.     
 
 
2. ANTI-LUCK EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
As noted above, the chief moral that is generally extracted from the post-Gettier literature is that 
the justification condition does not suffice to exclude knowledge-undermining luck as had been 
widely supposed. In a nutshell, the justification condition in the tripartite account of knowledge 
does not suffice to accommodate the anti-luck intuition. The post-Gettier debate thus inevitably 
generates a discussion of what sort of epistemic condition or conditions could accommodate this 
intuition.  
 One proposal that came to the fore in the early literature was that a necessary condition on 
knowledge was that one’s true belief should be sensitive, in the following sense: 
 
The Sensitivity Principle 
If S knows that p then had p not been true S would not have believed that p.7 
 
The foremost exponent of this principle was of course Robert Nozick, but one can find 
endorsements of very similar principles in the work of a number of important philosophers, and 
this principle is still defended today.8  
 The sensitivity principle has no trouble dealing with Gettier-style cases. Consider the 
following three Gettier-style cases that are often discussed in the literature, all of which involve a 
true belief which enjoys good epistemic support and yet which doesn’t amount to knowledge 
because of the presence of epistemic luck: 
 
Edmund 
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Edmund forms a belief that Jones owns a Ford on excellent grounds. He then validly infers that 
either Jones owns a Ford or Smith is in Barcelona, and accordingly forms a belief in this entailed 
proposition solely on the basis of his grounds for believing the entailing proposition and the relevant 
deduction. As it happens, the entailing proposition is false; the entailed proposition, however, is true 
since it just so happens (and unbeknownst to Jones) that Smith is in Barcelona.9  
 
Roddy 
Using his reliable perceptual faculties, Roddy non-inferentially forms a true belief that there is a 
sheep in the field before him. His belief is also true. Unbeknownst to Roddy, however, the truth of 
his belief is completely unconnected to the manner in which he acquired this belief since the object 
he is looking at in the field is not a sheep at all, but rather a sheep-shaped object which is obscuring 
from view the real sheep hidden behind.10  
 
Barney  
Using his reliable perceptual faculties, Barney non-inferentially forms a true belief that the object in 
front of him is a barn. Barney is indeed looking at a barn. Unbeknownst to Barney, however, he is in 
an epistemically unfriendly environment when it comes to making observations of this sort, since 
most objects that look like barns in these parts are in fact barn façades.11  
 
In all three cases we have examples of cognitive success which is such that, had the relevant fact 
been otherwise (but everything else had remained the same, consistent with that change), then the 
agent would have continued to believe the target proposition regardless, and hence would have 
believed falsely. Had it been false that either Jones owns a Ford or Smith is in Barcelona⎯i.e., had 
Smith not in fact been in Barcelona but away visiting friends in Tarragona, say⎯then clearly 
Edmund would have continued to believe this proposition regardless, since his basis for this belief 
(his grounds for believing that Jones owns a Ford, and his knowledge of the relevant entailment) 
would be unchanged. Had it been false that there is a sheep in the field⎯i.e., if the sheep in 
question had wandered into a neighbouring field⎯Roddy would have continued to believe this 
proposition regardless, since his basis for this belief (the sheep-shaped object that he can see in the 
field) would be unchanged. And had it been false that the object that Barney is looking at is a 
barn⎯i.e., if it were a barn façade⎯Barney would have continued to believe this proposition 
regardless, since his basis for this belief (that he is presented with a plausible barn-shaped object) 
would be unchanged. All three cases thus involve an insensitive true belief, and hence the 
sensitivity principle has no trouble explaining why they do not amount to knowledge.  
 The sensitivity principle can also deal with other cases which trade on the anti-luck intuition 
too, such as the lottery case in which the agent lacks knowledge even while having a true belief 
which is supported by excellent grounds: 
 
Lottie 
Lottie has a ticket for a fair lottery with very long odds. The lottery has been drawn, although Lottie 
has not heard the result yet. Reflecting on the odds involved she concludes that her ticket is a loser. 
Lottie’s belief that she owns a losing ticket is true.  
 
The sensitivity principle can explain why Lottie lacks knowledge because her true belief, despite its 
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excellent epistemic pedigree, is insensitive. Had it been false that Lottie’s ticket was a losing 
ticket⎯i.e., had Lottie won the lottery⎯then she would have continued to believe this 
proposition regardless, since her basis for this belief (gained by reflecting on the long odds 
involved in winning) would be unchanged.  
 Moreover, the sensitively principle can also explain why Lottie’s lack of knowledge in this 
case is compatible with the undeniable fact that Lottie could have gained knowledge of the target 
proposition in other ways where the supporting evidence would have been weaker from a 
probabilistic point of view. For example, Lottie can gain knowledge that she has a losing ticket by 
reading the result of the lottery in a reliable newspaper, and yet the chances of her forming a false 
belief on this basis are surely higher than the chances of her forming a false belief in the same 
proposition by reflecting on the long odds involved. No matter how reliable the newspaper is, it is 
surely the case that the odds that it contains a misprint in this regard are higher than the odds of 
winning your average national lottery. Sensitivity can account for what is going on here because 
had Lottie formed her belief in the target proposition by consulting a reliable newspaper then her 
belief would have been sensitive. For suppose that Lottie wins the lottery but everything else 
consistent with this stays the same. Given Lottie’s basis for her belief, she would no longer believe 
that she had a winning ticket since in this counterfactual scenario she would be looking at the set 
of winning ticket printed numbers in her reliable newspaper.  
 The contrast between these two variations on the Lottie case demonstrates that a high 
probabilistic strength of one’s evidence (at least if it falls short of 1) may not suffice to ensure that 
one’s belief is sensitive. Sensitivity thus explains what is going on in these two cases by 
highlighting the surprising point that while what is required for knowledge is an epistemic basis 
which ensures the sensitivity of one’s belief, the probabilistic strength of one’s evidence, no matter 
how strong (bar a probabilistic strength of 1), may not suffice to supply such an epistemic basis.12   
 Sensitivity thus seems to be able to deal with the anti-luck intuition, and hence appears to be 
a strong contender to be the right way of thinking about the anti-luck condition on knowledge. 
This principle faces a range of problems, however, not least of which is that it is unable to deal 
with a certain kind of inductive knowledge.13 Consider the following case: 
 
Ernie  
Ernie deposits a rubbish bag into the rubbish chute in his high-rise flat. He has every reason to think 
that the chute is working correctly and so believes, a few minutes later, that the chute is in the 
basement. His belief is true.14 
 
Intuitively, Ernie has knowledge in this case, since even though he hasn’t seen the rubbish in the 
basement, he does have an excellent inductive basis for thinking that it is there. Clearly, though, 
Ernie’s belief is not sensitive, since had the rubbish not made it to the basement, but everything 
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else had stayed the same (had a workman recently damaged the chute so that rubbish was getting 
stuck on the third floor for example), Ernie would have continued to believe what he does 
regardless, and so would have believed falsely.  
 It is problems like this that have led commentators to move away from the sensitivity 
principle and adopt a similar modal principle which seems better placed to capture our intuitions 
about knowledge:   
 
The Safety Principle 
If S knows that p then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false.15  
 
The safety principle is also able to deal with Gettier-style cases, since in all such cases the agent 
forms a true belief in such a way that she could have very easily been in error. Had Jones not been 
in Barcelona but in Tarragona instead then Edmund would have believed falsely; had the sheep 
wandered into a neighbouring field then Roddy would have believed falsely, and had the object 
before Barney been a barn façade rather than a barn then he would have believed falsely. 
Moreover, the safety principle can also deal with the lottery case, since this too involves a belief 
that could very easily had been false, had Lottie happened to be in possession of the one winning 
ticket (we will return to this point). Indeed, the safety principle offers the same kind of explanation 
of why Lottie lacks knowledge as we saw being offered by the sensitivity principle, since what is 
important is not the probabilistic likelihood of error (which is of course very low), but rather the 
modal closeness of that error. 
 Where the safety principle has an advantage over the sensitivity principle is when it comes to 
the problem posed by the kind of inductive knowledge at issue in the Ernie case. For while Ernie’s 
beliefs are not sensitive, they are safe. Given how he formed his belief, after all, it couldn’t have 
easily been the case that his belief is false. Now, one might baulk at this claim on the grounds that 
whether it really is the case that Ernie’s true belief could very easily have been false is an open 
question given how the case is described. Perhaps, for example, there is a snag in the rubbish 
chute that Ernie’s bag of rubbish could so very easily have snagged on? If so, then even despite 
the inductive basis for his belief, it is not safe since it could very easily have been false (after all, in 
such a case where it does get caught on the snag on the way down, Ernie would still believe on the 
same inductive basis that the rubbish is in the basement, and so believe falsely). 
 Interestingly, though, this issue in fact speaks in favour of safety rather than against it, since 
it highlights that examples like the Ernie case need to be understood in a certain way if we are to 
attribute knowledge to our protagonist. For note that while it is true that the presence of a snag in 
the rubbish chute that could so very easily have prevented the rubbish from getting to the 
basement suffices to make the target belief unsafe, if we understand the example in this way then 
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there is no temptation at all to think that Ernie has knowledge. In contrast, if we interpret the 
example in the way that we naturally tend to, so that there are no snags and such like to prevent 
the rubbish from getting to the basement, then the intuition that Ernie has knowledge returns, but 
so too does the safety of the target belief. If significant change in the actual circumstances is 
required to ensure that the rubbish fails to reach the basement (significant change, moreover, 
which is undetectable to Ernie), then his belief will be safe, since it couldn’t easily have been false. 
 Considering the Ernie case in light of the Lottie case is also instructive in this regard. Very 
little about the actual circumstances is required to change to ensure that Lottie’s true belief 
becomes undetectably false, and this explains why her belief is unsafe and so not a candidate for 
knowledge. In contrast, quite a lot has to change about the actual circumstances to ensure that 
Ernie’s true belief becomes undetectably false, and this explains why his belief is safe and so, on 
this score at least, in the market for knowledge.  
 This illustrates an important point which fits quite snugly with our anti-luck intuition. In 
wanting our cognitive success to be immune to luck we are not thereby desiring that it be free 
from any possibility of error, no matter how remote. Accordingly, as the error becomes more 
remote—i.e., as more needs to change about actual circumstances for the agent to 
(counterfactually) form a false belief—so we become more tolerant of it, to the point where we no 
longer regard the counterfactual error as indicating that there was anything lucky about the target 
cognitive success. The anti-luck intuition thus manifests itself, in keeping with how we are reading 
the safety principle, with a complete intolerance of error in close counterfactual circumstances, a 
tolerance of error in remote counterfactual circumstances, and a sliding scale of tolerance between 
these two extremes. So in the Lottie case, for example, where the counterfactual error is very close, 
we have no hesitation in dismissing the possibility of knowledge on anti-luck grounds. In contrast, 
in a parallel Lottie case where the belief in the target proposition is formed in an appropriate way 
(e.g., by reading a reliable newspaper), and where as a result there isn’t any close counterfactual 
error, we are happy to attribute knowledge (even though the probabilistic likelihood of error may 
be higher). As we have seen, in examples like the Ernie case one can fill out the details in such a 
way as to elicit different responses. If you make the counterfactual error close, as when one 
supposes that the chute has a snag in it, then one loses the intuition that the target belief is in the 
market for knowledge and it also ceases to be safe. If, on the other hand, one reads the example in 
the natural way such that the counterfactual error is remote, then one retains the intuition that this 
is a case of knowledge and the target belief is also safe.16 
 There is another prima facie problem that faces the safety principle but which turns out to be 
illusory, which concerns how the principle would deal with necessary propositions, or at least 
propositions which are true in all circumstances similar to the actual circumstances in which the 
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belief was formed. The worry is that any true belief in such a proposition is trivially guaranteed to 
be such that it could not easily be false, but not because of any epistemically relevant feature of the 
belief (such as its epistemic standing) but purely because of the nature of the proposition believed. 
Consider, for example, the following case: 
 
Mathema 
Mathema uses a calculator to find out the sum of 12 × 13. As a result, he forms a true belief that 12 
× 13 = 156. Unbeknownst to Mathema, however, his calculator is in fact broken and generating 
‘answers’ randomly. 
 
Clearly Mathema does not know the target proposition. And yet, given that this proposition is 
necessarily true, it appears that it can’t be the case that his belief could easily have been false, and 
hence we seem committed to holding that this belief is safe. Rather than being a devastating 
counterexample to safety, however, cases like this highlight that we need to understand safety in a 
quite specific way.  
 When we talk of a safe belief that p being such that it could not have easily been false, it is 
tempting to suppose that this means that the agent’s belief that p in similar circumstances would 
not be false. This reading of the safety principle is indeed susceptible to problem cases like 
Mathema, since where the proposition in question is such that it is not false in any circumstances 
(similar or otherwise) then clearly the agent cannot help but have a true belief in this propositions 
which couldn’t easily be false, regardless of the epistemic standing of this belief. On reflection, 
however, it is clear that this is not the right way to read safety. For what we are interested in is 
rather how the agent forms her beliefs in similar circumstances and in response to the same 
stimuli. These beliefs may be beliefs that p, but equally they may be beliefs in distinct propositions 
too.  
 In order to see this point, consider the Mathema case again. While there is indeed no similar 
circumstance in which we can imagine Mathema forming a belief that 12 x 13 = 156 on the same 
basis and yet believing falsely, we can certainly imagine lots of similar circumstances in which 
Mathema forms her belief on the same basis and yet ends up with a false belief, such as the similar 
situation in which the calculator generates a different result. Mathema’s belief is thus unsafe, and 
hence the safety principle is perfectly able to explain why Mathema lacks knowledge in this case, at 
least so long as we formulate that principle correctly.17 
 In the safety principle, then, we seem to have a way of thinking about the anti-luck 
condition on knowledge that is in keeping with our general intuitions in this regard and which 
isn’t, on closer inspection, susceptible to some obvious problems.18,19 Moreover, notice that the 
safety principle isn’t just responding to the problem posed by Gettier-style cases but also to other 
problem cases in epistemology too, such as the lottery case. With this in mind, one might become 
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tempted by the idea that all that is required of a theory of knowledge is a properly formulated anti-
luck condition, such that knowledge is true belief that satisfies this anti-luck condition. Call this an 
anti-luck epistemology.20 Is such a view tenable? 
 If it is tenable then it needs to be able to accommodate the ability intuition that we began 
with. On the face of it, this shouldn’t be a problem since in all the cases we have considered so far, 
where the safety principle has been satisfied the agent concerned has exhibited the relevant 
cognitive ability. Indeed, one might think that reflecting on the anti-luck condition demonstrates 
that this is the more general intuition about knowledge. After all, in Gettier-style cases the agent’s 
cognitive success is the product of ability and yet she lacks knowledge because she doesn’t satisfy 
the anti-luck intuition. In contrast, in the cases we’ve looked at where the agent satisfies the anti-
luck condition, and so has knowledge, the agent also satisfies the ability intuition. Thus it seems 
that there is a prima facie case for supposing that while a correct formulation of the ability condition 
will not be able to satisfy the anti-luck intuition (because of Gettier-style cases), a correct 
formulation of the anti-luck condition will be able to accommodate not just the anti-luck condition 
but also the ability condition.  
 Alas, anti-luck epistemology, despite its surface attractions, will not pass muster. Before we 
get to a decisive consideration against this view, I first want to consider a problem which I don’t 
think is decisive at all (though which might look that way if one approaches anti-luck epistemology 
from a certain theoretical angle). The concern is that anti-luck epistemology is essentially wedded 
to epistemic externalism, and a very natural line to take is that no epistemically externalist theory 
of knowledge could ever fully accommodate the ability intuition.  
 There are various ways of formulating the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction, but 
most (if not all) epistemic internalists would agree that a necessary requirement for knowledge is 
that the knower has good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of her belief in the target 
proposition.21 Clearly, anti-luck epistemology does not demand this, since there is nothing about 
satisfying a modal condition like safety which would entail that one has such grounds. Anti-luck 
epistemology thus entails epistemic externalism. Does this fact suffice to demonstrate that anti-
luck epistemology cannot satisfy the ability intuition? 
 I think not, or at least I don’t think we should let an issue like this settle the matter. For 
while there is certainly a way of thinking about the ability intuition such that it demands that one’s 
knowledge be due to cognitive ability in such a way that such ability is always accompanied by 
reflectively accessible grounds, such an interpretation is bound to be contentious because of its 
obvious negative implications for epistemic externalism. Indeed, epistemic externalists will surely 
respond by claiming that while it might well be desirable to possess reflective epistemic support 
for our beliefs, and while it might often be the case that the exercise of cognitive ability generates 
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such grounds (we are reflective creatures after all), it is wrong to build such an internalist 
requirement into the ability intuition in this way.  
 Interestingly, the kinds of examples that epistemic externalists and internalists argue over are 
precisely cases where the agent’s cognitive success is held to be the product of her cognitive 
ability. In the notorious chicken-sexer case, for instance, it is built into the example that the agent 
has a highly reliable cognitive ability which enables her to form true beliefs about the sex of the 
chicks (it is just that our agent is held to be able to manifest such an ability while having no good 
reflectively accessible grounds in favour of the beliefs formed in this way). It is thus not meant to 
be in question that the agent satisfies the ability intuition (and, for that matter, the anti-luck 
intuition), though unsurprisingly the epistemic internalist will not be happy with an ascription of 
knowledge in this case. While it is of course open to the epistemic internalist to insist that a more 
demanding construal of the ability intuition should be adopted, one that is not satisfied in the 
chicken-sexer case, this would be a rather blunt dialectical move to make in this debate, one that 
would be of little concern to the epistemic externalist who will simply insist on their own more 
inclusive reading of the ability intuition.22 
 In any case, I don’t think we should let a controversial interpretation of the ability intuition 
decide the matter when it comes to evaluating anti-luck epistemology, for it is surely preferable to 
make such an evaluation on theory-neutral grounds if we can. As it happens, there is a type of case 
which poses a problem for anti-luck epistemology which both epistemic externalists and epistemic 
internalists should agree on. In particular, such a case shows that anti-luck epistemology cannot 
satisfy the ability intuition, regardless of whether we interpret that intuition along externalist or 
internalist lines.  
 Consider the following example: 
 
Temp 
Temp forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a thermometer. His beliefs, 
so formed, are highly reliable, in that any belief he forms on this basis will always be correct. 
Moreover, he has no reason for thinking that there is anything amiss with this thermometer. But the 
thermometer is in fact broken, and is fluctuating randomly within a given range. Unbeknownst to 
Temp, there is an agent hidden in the room who is in control of the thermostat whose job it is to 
ensure that every time Temp consults the thermometer the ‘reading’ on the thermometer 
corresponds to the temperature in the room. 
 
Intuitively, Temp cannot know the temperature in the room by consulting a broken thermometer 
in this way, even if his beliefs so formed are guaranteed to be true. In particular, what is wrong 
with Temp’s beliefs is that they exhibit the wrong direction of fit with the facts, for while his 
beliefs formed on this basis are guaranteed to be true, their correctness has nothing to do with 
Temp’s abilities and everything to do with some feature external to his cognitive agency. This 
means that what is underlying our intuition that Temp lacks knowledge in this case is the fact that 
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his beliefs fail to satisfy the ability intuition. Moreover, notice that it makes no difference whether 
we suppose that Temp has good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of his beliefs in this case, 
since either way they will not amount to knowledge. Thus, such an example does not trade on the 
fact that anti-luck epistemology is an externalist theory of knowledge.  
 Notice that whatever formulation of the anti-luck condition one opts for Temp will satisfy 
that condition. More generally, whatever one wishes to say about what is epistemically deficient in 
Temp’s beliefs, it doesn’t seem that his beliefs fail to satisfy the anti-luck intuition. After all, his 
beliefs are guaranteed to be true given how he is forming them, and hence it can hardly be the case 
that his cognitive success is merely a matter of luck. More specifically, while his cognitive success 
is not the product of his cognitive ability, that’s not because it’s simply a matter of luck. 
 We can bring this point out more clearly by considering how Temp’s belief satisfies the 
safety principle.23 This is ensured by the fact that the manner in which Temp is forming his beliefs, 
such that success is guaranteed, means that it can hardly be the case that he could easily have 
formed a false belief. Note too that the problem in play here isn’t one that reveals a particular 
failing of our formulation of the safety principle, as if we could reformulate this principle in such a 
way as to ensure that a revitalised anti-luck condition could deal with this difficulty. For the 
underlying point demonstrated by this example is that no modal principle of the sort required to 
eliminate knowledge-undermining luck will be able to specify the kind of direction of fit that is 
required for a belief to satisfy the ability intuition. That is, in satisfying the relevant modal principle 
one ensures, across a suitable range of possible cases, that there is the right kind of 
correspondence between belief and fact; but what one doesn’t ensure thereby is that a certain 
relationship between belief and fact obtains, one that cases like Temp indicate is essential to the 
manifestation of cognitive success which is the product of cognitive ability.  
 
 
3. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The upshot of the foregoing is that no plausible formulation of the anti-luck condition can fully 
accommodate the ability intuition, and hence anti-luck epistemology is under serious threat. One 
could, of course, react by denying or modifying the ability intuition, and thereby arguing that we 
should attribute knowledge in the Temp case. Before one takes such a desperate course of action, 
however, it is worthwhile to consider whether there are any less painful options available. 
 Given what we said earlier about how the agents in Gettier-style cases nonetheless satisfy 
the ability intuition, one might think that there is little to be gained by trying to define knowledge 
in terms of true belief and an ability condition. Interestingly, however, there is a potential way of 
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getting around the problem posed Gettier-style cases in this respect, and hence such an alternative 
proposal may be viable after all. 
 It is useful at this juncture to say a little more about what a cognitive ability involves. We 
noted above that a cognitive ability is a knowledge-conducive belief-forming process. We could of 
course think of cognitive abilities more generally than in terms of belief-forming processes, since 
they could be thought to have an output which is not doxastic but, say, emotional. But given that 
our primary concern is with the theory of knowledge it makes sense for us to focus specifically on 
cognitive abilities which have a doxastic output. One change that we should make to our earlier 
rough characterisation is that it is better to think of abilities in terms of dispositions rather than 
processes. After all, one retains one’s cognitive abilities even when they are not exercised, but it is 
only when they are exercised that a belief-forming process is on display.   
 Given that we are engaged in the analytical project it is clearly not ultimately helpful to 
characterise cognitive abilities in terms of their conduciveness to knowledge. We thus need to ask 
what it is about the particular belief-forming dispositions that qualify as cognitive abilities that 
makes them knowledge-conducive. I take it that as a minimal requirement these belief-forming 
dispositions should be both reliable and suitably integrated with the agent’s other belief-forming 
dispositions. The former requirement is needed if we are to think of these dispositions as 
genuinely akin to skills or abilities more generally, while the latter requirement is needed if we are 
to think of these dispositions as genuinely reflecting the agent’s cognitive agency.  
 Note that as it stands any theory of knowledge which defines knowledge in terms of true 
belief that satisfies this conception of cognitive ability will be a form of epistemic externalism, just 
like anti-luck epistemology. This is because one can clearly manifest a cognitive ability in this sense 
while lacking any good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of one’s belief in the target 
proposition. Indeed, the oft-cited example of the chicken-sexer that we described above fits this 
rubric, since this is an agent employing a reliable belief-forming disposition which is appropriately 
integrated with her other belief-forming dispositions. For while it is part of the example that the 
agent is lacking any good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of her beliefs so formed, we are 
clearly meant to suppose that her chicken-sexing ability works in concert rather than in tension 
with her other relevant belief-forming dispositions. Indeed, it is this feature of the example that 
makes it compelling, for if there were conflict between the various belief-forming dispositions in 
play⎯if, for example, her chicken-sexing ability generates a belief that the two chicks before her 
have different genders, and yet she otherwise perceives that there is no discernible difference 
between the chicks⎯then we would not find the example even remotely plausible as a case of 
knowledge.     
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 So conceived, cognitive abilities are essentially the same as epistemic virtues, at least on a 
weak externalist construal of that notion.24 In what follows we will talk interchangeably of 
cognitive abilities and epistemic virtues, though we will also consider below how a more restrictive 
internalist conception of epistemic virtue would relate to our discussion. Accordingly, we can call 
any view which defines knowledge in terms of true belief plus an ability condition, a virtue 
epistemology, at least provided we keep in mind that our usage of this title is partly stipulative. Given 
how we are characterising the ability condition, any version of virtue epistemology will be an 
externalist theory of knowledge.  
 Call any view which simply holds that knowledge is true belief that is the product of 
cognitive ability a weak virtue epistemology. Weak virtue epistemology can certainly deal with the 
Temp case, since as we noted above the cognitive success exhibited by the agent in this example 
has nothing to do with the exercise of his cognitive abilities, and everything to do with the 
assistance of his hidden helper. Weak virtue epistemology can also deal with other cases that an 
anti-luck epistemology would struggle with as well, such as cases of reliable cognitive malfunction. 
Consider, for example, the following case: 
 
Alvin 
Alvin has a brain lesion. An odd fact about the brain lesion that Alvin has, however, is that it causes 
the sufferer to form the (true) belief that he has a brain lesion. Accordingly, Alvin truly believes that 
he has a brain lesion.25 
  
Given how Alvin is forming his beliefs he is guaranteed to be right, and hence his beliefs will 
thereby satisfy any anti-luck condition such as safety. Clearly, though, Alvin does not have 
knowledge in this case, and the reason for this is that his beliefs are true despite his cognitive 
abilities and not because of them. That is, what explains why Alvin’s beliefs do not amount to 
knowledge is the fact that they fail to satisfy the ability intuition, even though they do satisfy the 
anti-luck intuition.  
 Weak virtue epistemology, as an externalist theory of knowledge, will face the usual 
objections that are levelled against externalist theories by internalists, but I think we can 
legitimately set these concerns to one side for our purposes.26 This is because, as noted above, 
such a view faces a more pressing problem that does not trade on the epistemic 
externalism/internalism dispute, which is its failure to deal with Gettier-style cases. These are 
examples, after all, in which the agent’s cognitive success is the product of her (relevant) cognitive 
abilities. It seems to follow that since the agent in such cases does not satisfy the anti-luck 
intuition, and therefore lacks knowledge, so weak virtue epistemology cannot satisfy the anti-luck 
intuition either and thus cannot be a complete account of knowledge. 
 Recently, however, some commentators have argued that there is a way of re-thinking virtue 
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epistemology such that it might be able to deal with Gettier-style cases, and thus the anti-luck 
intuition, after all. The crux of the matter is the manner in which we think of the target cognitive 
success as being the ‘product’ of the relevant cognitive abilities. In weak virtue epistemology all 
that is demanded is that the target belief be the product of the relevant cognitive abilities and be, 
in addition, true, but this is not the only way of thinking about how a cognitive success can be the 
product of a cognitive ability.  
 In particular, it has been suggested that we should regard the cognitive success as being the 
product of the relevant cognitive abilities in the sense that the exercise of those cognitive abilities 
is the overarching explanation for the agent’s cognitive success, such that the cognitive success is 
primarily creditable to her cognitive agency.27 In the Temp case, for example, while there is both 
cognitive ability on display and cognitive success, one wouldn’t regard the cognitive success as 
being in any sense explained by Temp’s cognitive ability, since what explains the cognitive success 
is rather something external to Temp’s cognitive agency, the hidden helper. We can gloss this 
point by saying that what is epistemically amiss about Temp’s cognitive success is that it is not 
because of his cognitive ability but rather because of something external to his cognitive agency, 
where the ‘because of’ here is given an explanatory reading.28  
 Call the view that knowledge is cognitive success that is because of the exercise of the 
relevant cognitive abilities strong virtue epistemology.29 The question in hand is whether strong virtue 
epistemology can deal with the Gettier-style cases, and thus accommodate the anti-luck intuition. 
On the face of it, it seems that it can. 
 Consider again the Edmund case. While Edmund is cognitively successful and exhibits the 
relevant cognitive abilities, his cognitive success is not explained by his cognitive ability, but rather 
by the good fortune that the other disjunct in the proposition that he infers is, unbeknownst to 
him, true. Or consider the Roddy case. While Roddy is cognitively successful and exhibits the 
relevant cognitive abilities, his cognitive success is not explained by his cognitive ability, but rather 
by the good fortune that there happens to be a sheep in the field hidden from his view.  
 Moreover, strong virtue epistemology also predicts the right result in a range of other cases 
too. For example, Mathema’s cognitive success is not because of her cognitive ability but rather 
because of the good fortune that the broken calculator she uses delivers the right result, and hence 
strong virtue epistemology correctly treats her as lacking knowledge. Strong virtue epistemology 
also generates the right result in the Ernie case, since his cognitive success is best explained by his 
cognitive ability, at least so long as we understand the detail of such a case in such a way as to 
secure the intuition that Ernie knows. It thus appears that strong virtue epistemology might be 
able to succeed where anti-luck epistemology failed and offer a fully adequate theory of 
knowledge, one that can accommodate both the anti-luck and the ability intuitions.30 
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 Unfortunately, matters are not so straightforward, since there is a group of cases that the 
view struggles to cope with. Worse, these problem cases seem to make conflicting demands on the 
view, such that there doesn’t appear to be a principled way in which one could adapt the view to 
avoid it falling foul of these cases.  
 As with anti-luck epistemology, one class of problems facing the view will concern its 
commitment to epistemic externalism. I don’t think we should worry too much about such cases, 
partly because they are bound to be contentious due to the controversial nature of the epistemic 
externalism/internalism distinction, and partly because, as we will see in a moment, there are more 
pressing concerns which do not trade on this distinction. It is worth noting, however, that 
although we have opted for an inclusive externalist construal of cognitive ability/epistemic virtue, 
and thus formulated an externalist virtue epistemology based around this notion, it is open to 
those persuaded by epistemic internalism to take the different route of defining cognitive 
abilities/epistemic virtues along more restrictive internalist lines and then formulating an 
internalist virtue epistemology on this basis. They might demand, for example, that only those 
reliable belief-forming dispositions which generate the required reflectively accessible epistemic 
support should be counted as cognitive abilities/epistemic virtues.31 Accordingly, in setting forth 
an externalist version of virtue epistemology here we are not taking sides in the epistemic 
externalism/internalism dispute, and hence we can safely bracket the qualms that epistemic 
internalists will have with strong virtue epistemology as it stands. 
 With this point in mind, let us turn to those problems that afflict strong virtue epistemology 
by both externalist and internalist lights. First off, notice how strong virtue epistemology struggles 
with the lottery case. After all, Lottie’s cognitive success does seem to be explained by the exercise 
of her relevant cognitive abilities, doesn’t it? Put another way, if it is not Lottie’s cognitive ability 
that explains her cognitive success, then what does explain it? For note that the only plausible 
candidate here is the (epistemic) good fortune that her ticket is indeed a losing ticket. However, 
given the odds involved it is hard to see how this eventuality could be considered a matter of 
fortune at all. 
 Even if strong virtue epistemology is able to fend off this problem, a more serious difficulty 
lurks in the wings. We noted a moment ago that strong virtue epistemology seems to be able to 
deal with the Gettier-style cases, and we demonstrated this point by looking at the examples of 
Edmund and Roddy. Consider, however, how strong virtue epistemology fares when it comes to 
the Barney case. Unlike the Edmund and Roddy cases, the knowledge-undermining luck in this 
example is entirely environmental. Barney is, after all, really seeing a genuine barn, unlike, say, 
Roddy who merely thinks that he is seeing a genuine sheep. In a very real sense, then, Barney’s 
cognitive abilities are putting him in touch with the relevant fact, unlike in standard Gettier-style 
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cases where there is a kind of fissure between ability and fact, albeit one that does not prevent the 
agent from having a true belief regardless. Nonetheless, Barney’s environment is so epistemically 
unfriendly that he doesn’t count as having knowledge, despite his cognitive ability and his genuine 
perception of a barn, because his belief is manifestly unsafe, and so offends against the anti-luck 
intuition. The problem, however, is that given that Barney does undertake, using his cognitive 
abilities, a genuine perception of the barn, it seems that his cognitive success is explained by his 
cognitive abilities, unlike in standard Gettier-style cases. More specifically, it seems that strong 
virtue epistemology cannot explain why the agents in Gettier-style cases involving environmental 
epistemic luck lack knowledge.32 
 There are various lines of response that the proponent of strong virtue epistemology might 
make to this problem. One option, of course, is just to treat Barney as having knowledge, and at 
least one commentator has taken this route, though of course this is not without cost.33 A 
superficially more attractive option is to try to exploit the fact that abilities are relative to 
environments in order to evade the problem. In this way, one might be able to argue that Barney 
does not exhibit the relevant cognitive abilities at all, since the relevant abilities would be those 
highly specialised barn-spotting abilities that are applicable to this very unusual environment 
containing barn façades and of course, ex hypothesi, Barney does not have these abilities at all.  
Unfortunately, while this line of response may seem initially appealing, it does not bear up to close 
scrutiny.  
 In the first place, notice that while we do ordinarily relativise abilities to environments, we 
don’t tend to do this in a very fine-grained way unless there is a specific reason to do so. For 
example, the ability to play the piano is relativised to a broad class of normal environments, such 
that it wouldn’t count as a fair test of your ability to play this instrument to be given the task of 
doing so whilst, say, placed underwater. Nonetheless, in, for example, playing the piano while 
outside on a sunny day one is surely exhibiting the very same ability that one exhibits while playing 
inside, even though there are some additional factors to take into account (more environmental 
noise, say). The sort of coarse-grained relativization of abilities to environments found in ordinary 
language is of no use to the defender of strong virtue epistemology, however, since it is vital to 
their proposed solution to the Barney problem that a fairly nuanced relativization be appropriate. 
While this does not of course rule-out a response cast along these lines, this does mean that strong 
virtue epistemology would be forced to saddle itself to a revisionistic view about the nature of 
abilities, and this is hardly desirable.34 
 One might perhaps be willing to live with this sort of theoretical cost, if it were the only cost 
incurred. But there is a deeper problem lying in wait here. For not only does ordinary language not 
tend to relativise abilities to environments in a fine-grained way, neither does it relativise abilities 
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to environments in a way that would be relevant to the Barney case. Suppose, for example, that 
our hero is playing piano in a situation in which, unbeknownst to her, she could so very easily be 
underwater right now (but isn’t). Perhaps, for instance, she is in a room that is surrounded by 
water where the walls could completely give way and let the water in at any moment. Intuitively, 
the ability that our hero is displaying in this case is just the very same ability she displays when she 
plays the piano in normal environments. But here is the rub: the Barney case is entirely analogous 
to this example. After all, although Barney could so very easily have been presented with a barn 
façade in our example, the fact of the matter is that he isn’t. Similarly, just as our piano player 
could so very easily have been underwater, the fact of the matter is that she isn’t. Accordingly, just 
as we should treat our piano player as exhibiting her ordinary ability to play piano in this case, so 
we should treat Barney as exhibiting his ordinary cognitive ability to spot barns.35 So unless one is 
to offer a radically revisionary account of abilities, this way of defending strong virtue 
epistemology is a hopeless cause. 
 If this problem were not bad enough, there is another difficulty facing strong virtue 
epistemology, which concerns its ability to account for the epistemology of testimonial belief. 
Most accounts of the epistemology of testimonial belief allow that an agent can, in suitable 
circumstances, come to gain knowledge by, for the most part, trusting the word of a 
knowledgeable informant. To deny this, most claim, is to succumb to a kind of scepticism about 
testimonial knowledge, given how much of our testimonial knowledge is gained in this way. The 
problem, however, is that strong virtue epistemology seems unable to account for testimonial 
knowledge of this sort. Consider the following case: 
 
Jenny 
Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that she meets for directions. 
The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about the area, and helpfully gives her directions. 
Jenny believes what she is told and goes on her way to her intended destination.36  
 
On most views of the epistemology of testimony, Jenny gains knowledge in this case. Moreover, 
notice that insofar as we are willing to ascribe knowledge in this case then we will be 
understanding the details of the case such that the true belief so formed satisfies the anti-luck 
condition. For example, in crediting Jenny with knowledge in this case we are taking it as given 
that there is no conspiracy afoot among members of the public to deceive her in this regard, albeit 
one which is unsuccessful in this case. The problem, however, is that it is hard to see how 
crediting knowledge to Jenny can be squared with strong virtue epistemology. After all, given that 
she forms her belief by, for the most part, trusting the word of another, Jenny’s cognitive success 
does not seem to be explained by her cognitive abilities specifically at all, but rather by her 
informant’s. If that’s right, then it seems that strong virtue epistemology should deny knowledge in 
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these cases, despite this being a counterintuitive result, and accordingly align themselves with the 
unpopular ‘sceptical’ view regarding the epistemology of testimony.37 
 If proponents of strong virtue epistemology do not opt to take this line then one strategy 
they might try to exploit is to claim that Jenny is exhibiting a far greater degree of cognitive ability 
than at first meets the eye. Now it is certainly undeniable that Jenny is exhibiting some relevant 
cognitive ability in this case. Although she in fact asks the first person she meets for directions, we 
are clearly meant to be reading the example such that she does exercise some discretion in this 
respect. Had the first person she met been obviously mad, or a stereotypical tourist, for example, 
then we would expect her to move on to the next prospective informant down the street. 
Moreover, we expect Jenny to be exercising similar discretion when it comes to what she is told, 
and how she is told it. If the informant were to give her directions which were manifestly false, for 
instance, then we wouldn’t expect her to follow them regardless. Furthermore, if the manner in 
which the informant passed on the directions was clearly questionable—if the informant was 
vague, shifty, hostile and evasive, say—then we would expect our hero to exercise due caution. It 
is undeniable then that Jenny exhibits a fair degree of relevant cognitive ability, and hence one 
might try to argue on this basis that despite first appearances her cognitive success is because of 
her cognitive abilities after all.   
 The problem facing this line of counterargument is that it doesn’t really get to the nub of the 
problem. After all, no-one is denying that Jenny’s cognitive success is in part due to her cognitive 
abilities: this case is not meant to be an counterexample to the ability intuition. The point, 
however, is that the degree of trust involved in this case means that the cognitive success is not 
because of Jenny’s cognitive abilities⎯viz., it is not primarily creditable to Jenny’s cognitive abilities 
that she is cognitively successful. To ensure that Jenny’s cognitive success would be because of her 
cognitive abilities it would be necessary to substantially reduce this degree of trust, but then one is 
back to the original counterintuitive response of arguing that Jenny lacks knowledge in this case 
after all.38  
 Although the Jenny case causes a problem all by itself, the Jenny and Barney cases 
collectively pose a quite formidable difficulty. For notice that while the Barney case puts pressure 
on the proponent of strong virtue epistemology to strengthen her account of knowledge so that it 
excludes knowledge in this case, the Jenny case puts pressure on the proponent of strong virtue 
epistemology to weaken her account. Thus, the two types of case pull this account of knowledge in 
two opposing directions, with the potential of collectively pulling the view asunder. For if you 
strengthen the view in order to deal with the Barney case then you face an even tougher problem 
when it comes to the Jenny case; and if you weaken the view in order to deal with the Jenny case 
then you face an even tougher problem when it comes to the Barney case.39,40   
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4. ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Rather than review all the various ways in which one might go about defending either a virtue 
epistemology or an anti-luck epistemology I want to suggest that the difficulties facing these two 
views in fact demonstrate that we need an account of knowledge which synthesizes the best 
features of both. As we will see, such a view is not only able to evade the difficulties facing these 
alternative positions but can also be motivated on independent grounds. In short, there is no need 
to revise one’s anti-luck or virtue epistemology in order to deal with the problems in hand, thereby 
incurring the various theoretical problems that such revisions will bring, since there is an 
alternative proposal available that does the job without need to resort to such manoeuvres. 
 In order to see what this proposal amounts to, let us return to the two intuitions that we 
began with. Whereas anti-luck epistemology takes the anti-luck intuition as primary and then tries 
to account for the ability intuition by appeal to an anti-luck condition, virtue epistemology treats 
the ability intuition as primary and then tries to account for the anti-luck intuition by appeal to an 
ability condition. Both proposals thus effectively treat these intuitions as essentially intertwined, 
such that properly responding to one of them thereby accommodates the other. This is their 
fundamental mistake, since the proper way to think about the relationship between these two 
intuitions is as treating them as posing two distinct demands on knowledge.  
 On reflection, this is not as surprising as it may at first seem. On the one hand, we have seen 
that dealing with the anti-luck intuition leads us to adopt an anti-luck condition which involves a 
modal principle. But if that’s right, then it is to be expected that one could satisfy such a condition 
while not exhibiting any cognitive ability, since whatever modal requirement is imposed with 
imagination one could think of a way in which it can be satisfied in a manner that bears no relation 
to the agent’s cognitive abilities. The relevant modal principle will simply demand a match 
between belief and fact in appropriate counterfactual cases, but a cognitive ability requires far 
more than this—viz., it requires an appropriate direction of fit between belief and fact. On the 
other hand, on reflection there is no reason why forming a true belief through cognitive ability 
should suffice to meet the relevant anti-luck condition—such, after all, is the moral of Gettier-
style cases. One can exhibit one’s reliable cognitive abilities and yet form a true belief that could 
very easily have been false. 
 Furthermore, note that trying to ‘beef-up’ your anti-luck/ability condition in order to resolve 
these difficulties will only exacerbate the problem. As we saw in the last section, strong virtue 
epistemology is a good example of this point. Not only does the move to the more austere version 
of the view not deal with the anti-luck intuition, but it also now loses the ability to accommodate a 
common form of testimonial knowledge.  
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 Recognising that the anti-luck and ability intuitions are epistemically distinct, and therefore 
require independent epistemic conditions, leads us away from anti-luck and virtue epistemology 
and towards a hybrid view, which I call anti-luck virtue epistemology:  
 
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology 
S knows that p if and only if S’s safe true belief that p is the product of her relevant cognitive abilities 
(such that her safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency). 
 
This proposal incorporates both an anti-luck condition (the demand that the true belief be safe) 
and an ability condition. Note that the ability condition in play here is that proposed by a weak 
virtue epistemology rather than a strong virtue epistemology, except that in line with the hybrid 
nature of the account we are interpreting this condition as demanding that the agent’s safe 
cognitive success should be to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency. As we will 
see, so long as we accompany this ability condition with an anti-luck condition then there is no 
need to opt for the stronger rendering of the ability condition as a means of dealing with cases that 
trade on the anti-luck intuition. The conception of safety in play in the anti-luck condition should 
be understood along the lines set out above in §2.  
 Anti-luck virtue epistemology can accommodate all the usual problem cases. The Gettier-
style cases, including non-standard Gettier-style cases which involve environmental epistemic luck, 
like the Barney case, are dealt with by the anti-luck condition, since in all of these examples we 
have a true belief which is unsafe. The same goes for all the other cases which we noted above can 
be accommodated by the safety principle, such as the Lottie, Ernie and Mathema cases. In short, 
anti-luck virtue epistemology has all the advantages of an anti-luck epistemology. 
 Moreover, the kind of cases that anti-luck epistemology cannot deal with, such as the Temp 
and Alvin cases, are dealt with by the ability condition, since examples like this are precisely cases 
in which the agent has a safe belief which is not formed via the reliable cognitive traits that make 
up her cognitive character. In short, anti-luck virtue epistemology has all the advantages of a virtue 
epistemology. Crucially, however, since we have not ‘beefed up’ the ability condition in terms of 
adding a ‘because of’ clause in the manner of strong virtue epistemology, we do not need to worry 
about cases like the Jenny case. For while Jenny’s cognitive success is not primarily creditable to 
her cognitive agency, her safe true belief is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive 
agency and that is all that is required for knowledge on this view. Furthermore, the Barney case is 
dealt with by the separate anti-luck condition. Anti-luck virtue epistemology thus does not inherit 
the problems of strong virtue epistemology. 
 Finally, as with virtue epistemology, we do not need to concern ourselves here with how this 
view fares with regard to the epistemic externalism/internalism dispute. While the view as it is 
presently defined—with an inclusive externalist conception of cognitive ability in play—will be 
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controversial from an internalist perspective, there is nothing preventing the proponent of anti-
luck virtue epistemology from ‘internalising’ the ability condition in order to satisfy her internalist 
sympathies. 
 We thus seem to have an entirely adequate theory of knowledge, in that it can account for 
our most fundamental intuitions about what it is to have knowledge. Are we, qua epistemologists, 
home and dry?41 
 
 
5. DIAGNOSIS 
 
One question that we might ask about anti-luck virtue epistemology is why knowledge has this 
two-part structure in the first place. Put another way, why do we have these two master intuitions 
about knowledge, and have them in such a fashion that they make distinct demands on our theory 
of knowledge? It may be helpful in this regard to undertake a thought-experiment that has been 
suggested by Edward Craig as a way of casting light on the nature of knowledge.42 Imagine an 
imaginary society which lacked the concept of knowledge. Why might they feel the need to 
introduce it? Well, notice first that it would be very practically useful to have some way of picking 
out good informants⎯i.e., informants who can help us to find out the truth on matters that 
interest us. We could thus imagine a concept very like knowledge⎯a kind of proto-knowledge 
concept⎯being employed for just this purpose. Call this proto-knowledge, ‘knowledge*’, and call 
anyone who possesses knowledge* a ‘knower*’. The idea is then that it would be useful to label 
good informants as knowers*, and accordingly to label the accurate information that they offer on 
subjects about which they are good informants, knowledge*.  
 So, for example, imagine that John lives on a hill and so has a particularly good view of what 
is happening in the valley below (and that he is generally truthful and helpful, etc.,). He would thus 
be a good informant when it comes to a range of propositions concerning what is happening in 
the valley. It would clearly be practically useful for us to flag the fact that John is a good informant 
in this regard, and we can do this by calling him a knower* as regards these propositions, in that 
his true beliefs in these propositions amount to knowledge*.  
 Note that knowledge* is not yet like our concept of knowledge. For one thing, the concept 
only applies to other people’s true beliefs, while we also use the concept of knowledge to classify 
our own beliefs. In addition, in deciding whether an agent is a knower* we are only assessing how 
good an informant she is relative to the actual circumstances that she finds herself in⎯i.e., the 
‘live’ error-possibilities that are in play in her environment. In the case of John just described, for 
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example, all that is at issue is whether he has a good view of the valley and the ability (and 
inclination) to make use of this advantage. The salient error-possibilities when it comes to the 
question of whether he has knowledge* are thus things like whether there is something in his 
environment which is obscuring his view (a heavy fog, say). Note, however, that our concept of 
knowledge treats a far greater range of error-possibilities as salient. In particular, it is also 
responsive to potential error-possibilities, even if they are not actual. (Recall the anti-luck intuition, 
one consequence of which is that the fact that you could very easily have been deceived is a 
ground to deny you knowledge, even if in fact you were not deceived.)  
 Interestingly, however, we would expect the proto-concept which is designed to pick out 
good informants to evolve over time so that it begins to resemble our concept of knowledge. For 
example, we could imagine knowledge* ultimately being used to classify oneself and not just 
others, and the application of the concept being ‘stretched’ so that it is responsive to non-actual 
but potential error-possibilities, and not just the actual ones (a process that Craig calls 
‘objectification’). Over time, then, knowledge* would evolve into knowledge. 
 Many philosophers find this genealogical account of the source of the concept of knowledge 
to be very persuasive.43 In particular, virtue epistemologists often cite this story as offering support 
for their view.44 After all, this account of the source of the concept of knowledge puts good 
informants at the heart of the story, and one natural way of thinking about what constitutes a good 
informant is that she is an informant who is exercising a reliable cognitive ability (think, for 
example, of the case of John just described). This would thus appear to suggest that what is most 
central to the concept of knowledge is the ability intuition which is the primary concern of virtue 
epistemology. Interestingly, however, once we start to think about this account of the source of 
the concept of knowledge in more detail, it becomes apparent that it actually lends greater support 
to anti-luck virtue epistemology than it does to virtue epistemology.   
 In particular, while there is clearly something right about the suggestion that a good 
informant is a reliable informant, this does not play into the hands of the virtue epistemologist in 
the manner that it may at first appear. The reason for this is that there is an important ambiguity in 
the very notion of a reliable (and hence good) informant. In one sense, it means an informant who 
possesses a reliable cognitive ability with regard to the target subject matter (and who is willing to 
sincerely communicate what she believes, something that we will take for granted in what follows). 
In another sense, it means an informant whom one can rely on (i.e., whose information will not 
lead you astray).  
 Now one might naturally think that this is a distinction without a difference, in that 
informants who possess reliable cognitive abilities in the sense just specified are thereby 
informants one can rely on, and vice versa. Closer inspection, however, reveals that first appearances 
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are deceptive on this score. In order to see this, we just need to notice that it can be appropriate to 
rely on an informant who is forming her true belief via an unreliable cognitive ability, and also that 
it can be inappropriate to rely on an informant who nevertheless is forming a true belief via a 
reliable cognitive ability.  
 First, consider a potential informant who possesses a reliable cognitive ability as regards a 
certain subject matter but who is in an environment in which there exists a misleading defeater, 
one which you know about, but the prospective informant does not, and one which moreover you 
are unable to defeat. An example might be an informant who is a reliable barn detector, but where 
you have been given a misleading ground (e.g., false testimony from a good source) for supposing 
that the informant is in barn façade county. Given that this is a misleading defeater, the informant 
is in fact a reliable informant about the relevant subject matter. But given also that you know about 
the misleading defeater, and are aware that you are unable to defeat that defeater, would you be 
able to rely on this informant? Surely not.  
 The converse point also holds. In particular, we can imagine a case where there are 
compensating factors in play, known only to us, which mean that we can rely on the information 
presented to us by an informant even though this information is not the product of the 
informant’s reliable cognitive abilities. Imagine, for example, an informant who thinks that they 
have clairvoyant powers, but in fact is mistaken on this score (and we know this). Suppose further 
that we also know that this informant’s wife is a very powerful person who wants her husband to 
continue to believe that he has this power and hence does what she can, where possible, to make 
sure that events turn out in the way that her husband predicts. Finally, suppose that we know that 
the informant’s wife can fix the result of any horse race. With this knowledge in hand, the 
testimony of the informant regarding who will win tomorrow’s horse race would certainly be 
information that one could rely on, even though the informant’s true belief in this regard is in no 
way the product of a reliable cognitive ability.  
 In general, what is key to both of these kinds of cases is the role that luck is playing. In cases 
in which the informant’s relevant cognitive abilities are reliable but where we are nonetheless 
unable to rely on the information she provides, the problem is that a dose of bad epistemic luck is 
cancelling out the good epistemic luck that our informant possesses the relevant reliable cognitive 
abilities (and thus is in this sense a good informant). In the case described above, for example, this 
bad epistemic luck is the presence of the undefeated misleading defeater regarding the barn 
façades. In contrast, in cases in which the informant lacks the relevant reliable cognitive abilities 
but is nonetheless providing us with information that we can rely on, a dose of good epistemic 
luck on our part is cancelling out the poor epistemic luck that our informant lacks the relevant 
reliable cognitive abilities (and thus is in this sense a bad informant). In the ‘clairvoyant’ case 
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described above, for example, this good epistemic luck is our knowledge of the compensating 
factors in play.  
 With this point in mind, it ought to be clear why this ambiguity in the idea of a reliable 
informant explains why the concept of knowledge that evolves from the proto-concept will 
generate both the anti-luck and the ability intuition. For as the range of cases which the concept of 
knowledge is meant to apply to widens, so the distinction will open up between good informants 
who are reliable and good informants that we can rely on, and we would expect the concept of 
knowledge that results to respect both sides of this distinction. In particular, examples where an 
agent possesses the relevant reliable cognitive abilities but where the presence of epistemic luck 
means that we would not be able to rely on this agent qua informant would not be counted as 
cases of knowledge. Similarly, those cases in which an agent forms a true belief in an epistemically 
friendly environment—such that any true belief so formed would not be subject to epistemic 
luck—would not be counted as cases of knowledge so long as the agent concerned failed to 
exhibit the relevant reliable cognitive abilities (even though we could rely on this agent qua 
informant). In short, the concept of knowledge that results will both (i) disallow cases of true 
belief as knowledge where the belief isn’t appropriately due to the relevant cognitive abilities on 
the part of the agent, and (ii) disallow cases of true belief as knowledge where the truth of the 
belief is substantively due to luck and hence unsafe.  
 A very plausible and popular story about the genealogy of the concept of knowledge thus 
lends support to anti-luck virtue epistemology after all, despite first appearances. In fact, if I am 
right that the goal of picking out reliable informants is ambiguous in the way just described, then 
contrary to the prevailing wisdom on this score, this ‘just so’ account of the concept of knowledge 
actually favours anti-luck virtue epistemology over rival proposals, such as virtue epistemologies. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have thus seen that there is an account of knowledge available⎯anti-luck virtue 
epistemology⎯which is able to deal with a wide range of problem cases in epistemology, and 
which, more importantly, is able to deal with those cases in a more satisfactory way than 
competing proposals. Moreover, we have seen that there is a plausible diagnostic story available as 
to why knowledge should have the structure dictated by this proposal. There is thus good reason 
for supposing that anti-luck virtue epistemology is the right theory of knowledge to opt for. Far 
from being a lost cause, the analytical project is in fact alive and kicking. 
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